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The State essentially argues that the search of Thompson was 
justifiable under a "slightly different rule" than the 
requirements in Terry. (Brief of Appellee [Br.App.] at 13). The 
State cites case law holding that "a search of a companion of an 
arrestee is proper when under the totality of the circumstances, 
the officer could point to specific, articulable facts that led 
the officer to reasonably conclude that the companion might be 
armed or pose a risk to the safety of the officers or others" 
(Br.App. at 13). Under the totality of the circumstances test, 
the State concludes that the police officers had a "reasonable 
belief that [Thompson] might be armed and dangerous" (Br.App. at 
22). The State also argues that the securing of the arrest scene 
is a factor to be considered along with other factors to 
determine if the frisk was justifiable (Br.App. at 23). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE SEARCH OF 
THOMPSON WAS JUSTIFIABLE BECAUSE OF THE STATE'S NEED TO SECURE AN 
ARREST SCENE. 
The State concedes the trial court's conclusion is erroneous 
to the extent the ruling allows police officers, while securing 
an arrest scene, a carte blanche to search all persons present at 
the arrest scene (Brief of Appellee [Br.App.] at 25). The State 
argues the trial court's conclusion could be interpreted as 
meaning that the securing of the arrest scene is only one factor 
to be considered for determining whether the search was 
reasonable (Br.App. at 24-25). However, the State does not cite 
any case law or authority that considers securing an arrest scene 
as a factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of 
a search by a police officer. 
Including securing an arrest scene as a factor would be 
expanding the Terry rule beyond its intended purpose. The Terry 
Court held that a frisk was reasonable and justified: "(1) 'where 
a police officer. observes unusual conduct' which he interprets 
1
 in light of his experience' as indicating possible criminal 
activity and present danger, (2) 'where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman 
and makes reasonable inquiries, and (3) where nothing in the 
initial stages of the encounter dispel his reasonable fear for 
his own or other's safety.'" State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 660 
2 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
Adding securing an arrest scene as a factor to the Terry rule 
would be confusing and would give police officers an extension of 
their power to frisk people at arrest scenes. 
Therefore, Thompson asks this Court to correct the trial 
court's conclusion that "securing an arrest scene" justified the 
pat down frisk even if the trial court only considered securing 
the arrest scene as one factor of many to justify the search. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE DETENTION AND 
SUBSEQUENT PAT-SEARCH OF THOMPSON WAS LAWFUL PURSUANT TO THE 
GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN TERRY. 
Thompson asks this Court to use the rule as set forth in 
Terry and as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court that a pat-down 
frisk is justifiable by "whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of the others was in danger." State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 
659 (Utah 1985)(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). "Every frisk 
must be 'justified at its inception, and ... reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place." White, 856 P.2d at 660 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 20). In making a determination of "reasonableness" the need 
to search should be balanced against the invasion which the 
search entails. White, 856 P.2d at 661; Terrv, 392 U.S. at 21. 
In determining the "reasonableness" of the search, the 
3 
particular circumstances leading up to the pat-down frisk should 
be considered- If Officer Walker had a reasonable belief that 
Thompson was armed and dangerous, why didn't Walker detain 
Thompson at the initial encounter? Thompson was simply allowed 
to slip away as Walker was making the arrest of Lamoreaux. The 
fact that Walker had been involved in a drug related arrest in 
which semi-automatic weapons were seized one week earlier and 
that he allowed Thompson to leave his presence demonstrates, 
under the circumstances of this case, that a "reasonable prudent 
man" would not be warranted in a belief that Thompson was armed 
and dangerous. And, if Officer Salvage had a reasonable belief 
that Thompson was armed and dangerous, why didn't Salvage detain 
Thompson at the back of the house and at least escort Thompson to 
the front of the house? The actions of both Salvage and Walker 
demonstrate that the circumstances did not justify the pat-down 
frisk of Thompson, Therefore, Thompson asks this Court to 
correct the trial court's erroneous conclusion that the detention 
and search of Thompson was a lawful Terry search. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this CA day of February, 1997. 
)^dlM/(k^AC7^h jhttf, 
Margare/O P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Thompson U 
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